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	While all WTO members may participate, the current Doha Round is dominated by two actors—the US and EU25.​[1]​  Although no agreement will be possible without the acquiescence of all participants and although a range of other countries are important role players, the large US and EU share of world trade ensure that EU-US transatlantic differences have always dominated the agenda in GATT and WTO trade rounds.​[2]​  Much of the negotiations deal with issues in which developing countries have a strong interest.  In particular, the labor intensive sector of textiles and the natural resource intensive sector of agriculture, both feature prominently.
	The current Doha Round was launched in 2001 as the “Development Round” and while developing countries are playing a more active part than in the past, the current Round continues the pattern of US-EU dominance of the agenda.  Indeed, as Charlton and Young point out, the current US and EU negotiating priorities are not those which would produce the largest welfare gains for developing countries.​[3]​  Most of any welfare gains from developed country agricultural liberalization are likely to accrue to developed countries themselves, particularly the EU and US, as they remove their own economic inefficiencies.  Negotiations on reductions in restrictions on labor migration through the temporary movement of natural persons, the area in which Charlton and Young posit that developing countries stand to receive their largest share of any welfare gains, have seen limited progress.  
	While much of the market access issues in past rounds were dominated by US-EU negotiations over market access to each other’s markets, the market access negotiations in the current round are heavily focused on the extent to which the EU and the US will each provide more generous market access to the exports of developing countries -- and what they will each insist upon as quid pro quo.  In addition to market access issues, the negotiations hold the prospect of the elimination of developed country agricultural export subsidies.  MFN-based tariff cuts improve market access but also reduce the margin of preference previously enjoyed by countries receiving preferential access.  An end to agricultural export subsidies will drive up world prices for food.  Not all developing countries will benefit from these effects.
	Developing countries, like all countries, have different national interests.  Countries which have few export-oriented industries, and which have heavily protected tradable sectors, will tend to come to trade liberalization negotiations with a “defensive” posture.  Countries with diversified economies may strike defensive poses on sectoral issues in which they seek to retain as much as possible of their present protection of uncompetitive industries while striking offensive poses in sectors where their exports are being restricted by barriers to market access elsewhere.
	The Doha Round negotiations have seen developing countries coalesce into a number of groupings.  The collapse of the Cancun Ministerial, and the success of developing country coalitions at Cancun, have been analysed by Narlikar and Tussie.​[4]​  They describe developing country fears of US-EU collusion on agriculture and how a variety of developing country coalitions were formed around specific issues to reorient the negotiating agenda toward issues of developing country interest. A variety of taxonomies have been used by analysts to identify groupings of developing countries sharing common interests.  In the case of negotiating positions on agriculture, Barichello, McCalla and Valdes identify three heterogeneous subgroups: food exporting countries, food importing countries, and low income food deficit countries.​[5]​  The food exporting countries seek greater market access and an end to export subsidization.  The food importing countries face welfare losses with the ending of export subsidies, although their indigenous producers should gain from higher prices and an end to subsidized competition.  In addition, these countries are likely to rely on the WTO’s Special and Differential Treatment which, by limiting the obligations of poorer countries, allows them to continue to protect their domestic producers.  Many of the low income food deficit countries not only currently benefit from US and EU subsidized food exports, but are also recipients of a variety of US and EU preference programs.
	The Africa Group, including some members of the overlapping ACP Group and the Least Developed Countries have formed into the G90.  It is mainly composed of smaller developing countries.  Many of its members are simultaneously involved in negotiations with the EU on the EU’s proposed Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and some of them risk seeing their preferences in the EU and US markets eroded by Doha Round liberalization or by US and EU compliance with recent WTO Panel decisions.  In some instances, the gainers will be other members of the same group.  In other instances, the gainers will be more developed developing countries.  These middle income, more industrialized developing countries, including Argentina, Chile, China, Brazil, India, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa belong to the Group of Twenty (G20).  Members of this group have targeted US and EU agricultural subsidies.  In doing so, there interests are frequently in conflict with many of the least developed of developing countries.  LDCs which are food-importers are likely to be hurt by increases in world food prices associated with any reductions in US and EU agricultural export subsidies. ​[6]​ Many of these same countries face US and EU requests that they lower their high manufacturing tariffs and that they open up the service sectors of their economies, including banking and insurance.
	In addition to developing country coalitions there are coalitions cutting across levels of development such as the Cairns Group of seventeen temperate foodstuffs agricultural exporters.​[7]​  Some members of the Cairns Group also belong to the G20.  With the exception of South Africa, none of them is an ACP member.  The Cairns Group played an important part in the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations and has long opposed the trade effects of the CAP, sometimes in alliance with the US.  Continuing the role it played in the Uruguay Round, the Cairns Group is pressing the EU and US on providing greater market access and an end to subsidies.  To date, the Cairns Group and the US have resisted EU efforts to include geographical indications in the negotiations.  Examples of geographical indications are champaign, port, camembert etc.
	The post-Uruguay road has been littered with accidents, including the disastrous 1999 Seattle Ministerial meeting and the stalemated 2003 Cancun Ministerial.  Launched in Qatar in November 2001, the Doha Round’s original timetable called for countries to have produced ”modalities” of  their commitments by March 2003, draft commitments, based on these “modalities” for the Cancun meeting of September 2003, and negotiations to be completed by January 2005, a timetable which has long ago slipped away. With the limited outcomes of the Ministerial meetings, the Round was put back on track in 2004 with smaller meetings in Geneva of negotiators representing various coalitions.  This culminated in adoption of the Doha Framework Agreement of 31 July 2004. The next WTO Ministerial is scheduled for Hong Kong in December 2005 at which a “modalities text” is due to be agreed.  This would then be used as the basis for a final round of negotiations on offers.

The Original Doha Agenda
	The Doha negotiating agenda includes four broad sectors: agriculture, industrial goods, services and trade rules.  The service sector negotiations have faced the largest delays to date.  The EU and US have strong interests in obtaining greater market access, particularly in developing countries, for their financial and business services sectors.  On the other side of the coin, a service sector area of particular interest to developing countries, such as India, is the provision of temporary services through migration, the issue of temporary movement of natural persons under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Mode 4 provision of services.  However, the recent member state reaction to the Commission’s use of the country of origin principle in its draft directive on liberalizing the services market gives an indication of likely EU receptiveness to developing country proposals to relax immigration controls.  In addition to negotiations on these three sectoral issues, an additional negotiating item is reform of WTO rules, including limiting the use of so-called Trade Defence Instruments, such as anti-dumping measures.  This has become an objective of both the US and EU as producers in developing countries have sought increased reliance in recent years on contingency protection policies traditionally associated with their developed country counterparts.  In the years since the round’s launch, negotiations have increasingly been focused on a narrower range of issues culminating in the July 2004 Framework Agreement.

The July 2004 Framework Agreement  
	Following the failure of the Cancun Ministerial, less stage-managed negotiations on a way forward led to the July 2004 Framework Agreement for further negotiations.​[8]​  If there is a final Doha Round Agreement, it will likely be based on filling in the details to the “framework for establishing modalities” contained in the July 2004 Package.   Among the agreements to be included in any final Doha Round outcome was the following non-exhaustive list.

	Least Developed Countries (LDCs) would be exempted from all tariff reductions but are expected to substantially increase their commitments to tariff bindings..
	Developing countries should have a longer time table for implementing any reductions or eliminations of agricultural subsidies.
	The EU offer to phase out all agricultural export subsidies and the US offer to eliminate its export credits led to an agreement that all developed country agricultural export subsidization would end at some date to be determined. Food aid which displaces commercial production would also be eliminated as would all food aid “not in conformity with operationally effective disciplines to be agreed.”  
	The EU’s position that some agricultural subsidies, termed Blue Box subsidies by the Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement, be retained was included in the package.  However, the package sought to limit Blue Box subsidies by restricting them to no more than 85% of any Blue Box production base and to no more than 5% of the value of total agricultural production in some base period yet to be determined.  Blue Box subsidies are defined in the discussion on the URAA below.
	The framework for establishing modalities in agriculture also calls for the use of a tiered formula for cutting another broad category of trade distorting domestic agricultural subsidies, termed Total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS).  The formula, yet to be agreed upon, would require larger cuts to be made by countries with higher levels of these subsidies.  
	It was agreed that developed countries would cut these subsidies by 20% in the first year of any agreement.
	In seeking to reduce agricultural protection and improve market access, the package calls for “substantial overall tariff reductions” to be achieved by all participants except LDCs, again using a tiered tariff-cutting formula to achieve some harmonization and reduce tariff peaks.
	Agricultural tariff quotas would see a reduction or elimination of in-quota tariffs and “operationally effective improvements in tariff quota administration” to increase export opportunities particularly for developing countries.
	A yet-to-be-negotiated number of agricultural “sensitive sectors” could be excluded from the agricultural tariff reductions.
	The work programme explicitly recognized the importance of cotton for developing countries and a special sectoral subcommittee on cotton would work to ensure the sector got priority in general negotiations on market access, domestic subsidies and export subsidies.
	Tariffs on non-agricultural products would be cut using a formula to be applied to bound rates and, in the case of unbound rates, the formula would be applied to [twice] the level of MFN applied rates in place in November 2001.
	All non-ad valorem duties would be converted into ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) and bound using a methodology to be negotiated.
	The Singapore issues were reduced to one issue—trade facilitation, i.e. customs procedures, “with a view to further expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit”​[9]​. The Singapore issues had become a matter of great contention during the miscalculations of the Cancun Ministerial where the EU sought initially to include all four topics in the negotiations, eventually settled on two, but developing countries refused to include any of them in the negotiating agenda at the time. ​[10]​

	The July 2004 Package is far from an outcome to a Doha Round but it sets an agreed set of parameters for further negotiations.  In doing so, it reprised some Uruguay Round issues.  The EU had failed during the Uruguay Round to have US export credits defined as subsidies, and thus included in the cuts of the URAA.  Part of the price paid by the US in getting EU acceptance of a Doha Round goal that all export subsidies should be ended eventually was the inclusion of export credits in the Work Programme.  Still to be negotiated are various formulae to be applied to tariff and subsidy cuts.  Also still to be negotiated is the number of “sensitive” categories which would be excluded from deeper tariff cuts but all products presently sheltered by tariff quotas would see the quotas increased.  While the package’s Framework for Establishing Modalities in Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products exempts LDCs from tariff cuts, it requires them to increase substantially the number of product categories for which they have established tariff bindings.

II. Changes in the Trading System since Uruguay
	While the July 2004 package has established a “framework for establishing modalities” in negotiations, a final Doha Round Agreement will be shaped by a number of structural changes that have occurred in the trading system since the Uruguay Round.  Many of these structural changes are the result of US or EU policies in the interim.  These include the following:

	EU enlargement has expanded the constituencies represented by the Commission’s trade negotiators.
	In the interim, the US has assembled a growing network of preferential arrangements with its trading partners which, though not as extensive as the preferential arrangements of the EU, is a marked departure from the US’s previous reliance on multilateralism.
	Even though there are a shrinking set of other issues, agriculture appears likely to play an even bigger part in any final Doha Round Agreement than it did in the Uruguay Round
	Many developing countries had not participated actively in past rounds (or even belonged to the WTO) and whose interests were frequently ignored, have become more assertive and are playing a major role in the current round.  Leading developing countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa have now been joined by China, participating in its first round as a recent WTO member.  
	In shaping a Doha Round outcome at a time when they are also making other changes in their own trade policies, the EU and US face a growing problem that, despite the existence of the formidable Group of Twenty coalition of developing countries which is united on issues such as WTO governance and reducing agricultural subsidies, some proposed changes will benefit some developing countries at the expense of others.
	Recent developing country victories in WTO dispute settlement procedures involving US cotton and EU sugar policies pose painful political choices for the two losers and also for less competitive developing countries which benefited from some preferential treatment. Sectors such as bananas, cotton, textiles and sugar are obvious examples of sectors where US and EU trade liberalization pits not only domestic producers against importers but also pits one group of developing countries against another.
	Simultaneous with the round has come the ending of the quota-ridden global system of textile protection which has existed since the mid-1960s.  While textile markets are still protected by tariffs and by the threat of contingent protection, the arrival of China as the dominant textile producer poses a competitive threat not only to US and EU textile producers but to the developing country beneficiaries of the previous system of quotas. 

III. US and EU Preferential Arrangements
	Almost all of the developing countries participating in the Doha Round are recipients of preferences from both the US and the EU.  However, even as recipients of preferences, these countries face high barriers to market access in both US and EU markets, particularly in textiles and agricultural products which are viewed as ‘sensitive products” and where limits are set on the quantity of imports, thus eroding the value of preferences.  Moreover, while preferences generate rent transfers from developed country consumers, a variety of studies have cast doubt on the value of preferences as a tool to stimulate development.​[11]​  As Panagariya points out, between 1976 and 1998 the ACP share of EU imports fell from 6.7% to 3%, with a mere ten products accounting for 60% of total ACP exports to the EU​[12]​.  Nevertheless, in the mercantilist world of trade negotiations, preferences are defended by those receiving them and compensation is sought for their erosion.

EU Preferences
	The fine discriminatory distinctions in the EU’s treatment of its trading partners have been outlined by Sapir.​[13]​ The specific preferences granted to developing countries have also been examined by Panagariya​[14]​.  EU preferential arrangements, each with its own degree of preference, include customs unions (Andorra, San Marino, Turkey), the European Economic Area, Euro Med, Western Balkans, Pan European System, ACP, OCT, GSP and Everything But Arms (EBA).  Of the 148 members of the WTO in February 2005, all but 9 receive some form of preferential treatment from the EU.​[15]​  Indeed, apart from exceptions such as non-WTO member N. Korea, the WTO’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment is almost the worse treatment afforded its trading partners by the EU.
	EU preferences to developing countries are found largely in its Cotonou Agreement with 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and its EBA program for which all LDCs, including ACP, are eligible.​[16]​  The EBA program came into effect in March 2001 and provides duty-free entry into the EU for almost all LDC exports, including agricultural products.  It amends the EU’s GSP scheme and adds roughly 10% more tariff lines to the product coverage for imports from those LDCs which are not ACP countries.
	Only a handful of LDCs are not ACP countries and hence had relied on the EU’s GSP program.  Most of these are in South Asia and while they receive GSP treatment, they do not receive the additional ACP preferences.​[17]​Three agricultural products are initially excluded from full duty-free treatment. Bananas are to be phased in by 2006, sugar and rice by 2009, with an EBA duty-free quota for both sugar and rice established in the interim.  While the list of country beneficiaries is similar, the product coverage of EBA is considerably broader than the GSP of the US.   Prior to EBA, the most important non-ACP GSP beneficiary was Bangladesh.
	The EU’s GSP scheme offers preferences to some 178 developing countries.  The preferences take the form of either duty free entry or reduced tariffs.  In many instances, there are volume restrictions on the trade flows receiving the preferences.  In 2003, the EU reported GSP imports of €52 billion, considerably larger than US GSP imports of €16 billion.​[18]​  With its previous 1995-2005 GSP scheme expiring, the Commission had proposed a shorter, four-year life for a replacement scheme due to run from 2005-2008.  It had also proposed that the existing five levels of GSP preferences, some based on labour rights, environmental standards or anti-drug conditionality, be simplified to three levels—a general scheme, a “GSP Plus” for especially vulnerable countries with special development needs, and the EBA.  EBA preferences are available to the Least Developing countries.  GSP Plus would be available to countries with undiversified economies, defined as having more than 75% of EU imports of their GSP exports concentrated in five product categories.  In addition, qualifying countries should account for less than 1% of total EU GSP imports.  Finally, GSP Plus countries would be required to ratify a list of 27 international conventions on human rights, labour, environment and governance standards by the end of 2008.
	The new scheme extended the product coverage qualifying for GSP treatment to include 7200 tariff lines of the approximately 9000 non-zero MFN tariff lines.  The Commission’s proposals also introduced a new graduation criterion under which countries attaining a market share of 15% (12.5% for textiles) for a product would become subject to MFN treatment for that product.  As a result, China, which accounted for 36% of all EU GSP imports in 2003, would find itself graduating out of GSP in many product categories.  The Commission estimated that 80% of past Chinese GSP imports would now be subject to MFN treatment.  A number of member states were reported to wish to see India, with an 11% market share, join China in graduation from GSP treatment of its textiles and clothing products and sought a 10% market share criterion for this sector.
	Concurrent with its Doha negotiations, the EU is negotiating a set of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the ACP countries to replace the Cotonou Agreement which expires in 2008.​[19]​  While Cotonou and its predecessors provided unilateral preferential access to the EU market, the EPAs would be a system of reciprocal free trade agreements.  In addition to providing reciprocity to the EU through greater EU market access to the ACP countries, the EPAs would include South-South liberalization.  Faced with developing country resistance to inclusion of the Singapore Issues in the Doha Round at the Cancun ministerial, the Commission has sought to include these issues in its EPA discussions with the ACP countries.  As Young points out, the EU had long championed inclusion of the Singapore Issues, in part driven by its internal social agenda.​[20]​  However, in March 2005, the UK’s Department of Trade and Industry issued a policy paper calling for removing the Singapore issues from EPA negotiations unless their inclusion is specifically requested by ACP countries.​[21]​  In the non-trade sphere, in this year’s negotiations reviewing the operation of the EU’s Cotonou Agreement, the EU has sought allies in difference with the US on the International Criminal Court (ICC), by seeking to have all ACP countries ratify the ICC.  In the event, a compromise solution was reached, with ACP countries “seeking to take steps” rather than “agree to take steps” toward ICC ratification.​[22]​
	The margin of preference provided to EPA members, and the degree of discrimination against non-members, will be influenced by the extent to which the Doha Round produces cuts in MFN tariffs. The EU seeks to maintain preferential access after Doha.  In particular, it wants continued sugar preferences in any reformed sugar regime and wants traditional suppliers such as Bangladesh and India to continue to have textile preferences in the EU’s GSP.


Table 1:  EU Regional Agreements, May 2004


Type of trade regime	Name of agreement	Countries involved
Single market	European Economic Area (EEA)	Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway
Customs union		Turkey, Andorra, San Marino
Free-trade area		Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Faroe Islands, FYROM, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Romania, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia
Partnership and cooperation agreements (MFN treatment)		Russia and other former Community of Independent States countries
Non-reciprocal: contractual preferences	Mediterranean Agreements, Cotonou Agreements	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, Algeria, Egypt, Syria
Non-reciprocal: autonomous preferences	Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and Stabilization and Association Agreements.	Other developing countries and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo)




	In a reversal from its long-standing practice, the western side of the Atlantic has begun to mirror the EU’s use of a sophisticated web of preferential trading arrangements, particularly in trade with developing countries.  This trend accelerated under the guidance of US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick who negotiated twelve PTAs during President Bush’s first term.  These moved the US far down the road pioneered by the EU in establishing a web of preferential trade agreements with various trading partners.
	Today, in addition to NAFTA and unilateral preference schemes such as its GSP, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (fourteen countries), and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (37 countries)​[23]​, the US has negotiated FTAs with thirteen countries – Israel, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Singapore and Australia.​[24]​  In addition, four countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) are covered by the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).  Negotiations for other FTAs are in progress, or planned, with the five countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the UAE and Oman, Thailand, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru.
	Though not as extensive a network as the EU’s, the US provides similar gradations in its margin of preferences.  Average tariff rates for products covered by unilateral preferences such as the CBI or AGOA are below the MFN rate but higher than the rates used in the FTAs with Canada, Mexico, Israel, and Jordan.
	The AGOA was introduced in December 2000.  In 2003, thirty seven of the 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) met the political conditions for AGOA eligibility.  AGOA extends the US GSP scheme by providing duty free entry into the US for selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) for a wider range of exports than is available to other LDCs qualifying for GSP treatment. In particular, AGOA countries are not subject to the usual export limits on GSP treatment for many products.  However, eHowever, excluded from AGOA are some agricultural and food products, and some textiles and clothing products.  To qualify for duty-free and quota-free treatment, AGOA has a two-step system for country of origin rules for textiles and apparel with the low income SSA LDCs temporarily exempt from these rules and more developed SSA countries subject to an 85% US-SSA origin rule. Rules of origin are particularly important in determining whether a product qualifies for a degree of preferential treatment. 
	In 2004, US imports from SSA countries eligible for AGOA treatment amounted to $34.4 billions of which $26.6 bl. received AGOA or GSP treatment.  However, oil imports accounted for $23 billion or 87% of covered imports with Nigeria providing $15.4 of these oil imports, Angola $4.3, and Gabon $1.9 bl. ​[25]​
	US imports from LDCs were a little over $7 billion in 2001.​[26]​ In that year, the coverage rate of the US GSP was only 44% and the utilization rate was 96%.​[27]​  Almost $3 billion of US imports from LDCs consisted of mineral products, including oil.  Indeed, UNCTAD estimates that if Angolan oil is excluded from the calculations only 4% of US imports from LDCs are covered by the US GSP scheme and the value of the trade actually utilizing preferences is a mere $122 million.​[28]​  Textiles and clothing, with an average MFN tariff of 15.5% and footwear, with an MFN tariff of 37%, are excluded from the US GSP except for AGOA countries.  Non-African LDCs exporting these sensitive items, in particular Bangladesh which has an export structure heavily concentrated on the excluded products, pay the MFN rate.
	A number of AGOA countries have rapidly built up apparel exports to the US.  However, while apparel exports have grown, it would appear that not all of the tariff rents attributable to AGOA preferences are being captured by producers in AGOA countries.  In a perfectly competitive market, a group of exporters receiving a tariff preference would be able to raise their prices by the amount of the tariff.  Olarreaga and Őzden have used data on the post-AGOA price increases received by seven SSA textile exporting nations and compared them with the MFN tariff to calculate the distribution of the tariff rent.​[29]​ They report that, on average, only a third of the tariff rents accrue to AGOA producers and that while S. Africa is able to capture 80%, some other countries (Malawi and Lesotho) capture less than 20%.
	In 2003, total US merchandise imports from SSA were $33 billion of which 44%, or $14 billion (95% of total imports from AGOA countries), were duty-free imports from AGOA-eligible countries.​[30]​ Imports from SSA account for approximately 2% of total US imports.  The EU reports only a slightly marginally higher percentage. AGOA preferences are concentrated in a small number of product categories including mineral products (largely oil). Textile imports are tightly controlled with a utilization rate in 2001 of 35.8%, a rate similar to that found for textiles in the EU’s GSP, but by 2003 this had risen to over 90% for a select group of beneficiary countries.​[31]​









Source: US International Trade Commission Value of US imports for consumption, duties collected, and ratio of duties to values 1891-2003. February 2004.


Measuring the Generosity of US and EU Preferences for LDCs
	While both the EU and US have widened the scope of their preferential treatment of LDCs, several characteristics of their respective schemes limit their generosity.  A variety of reasons may be advanced.

	Producer interests in sensitive sectors such as agriculture, textiles and clothing, and footwear ensure that in both the EU and US there are limits to the range of products covered by the schemes and, even when product coverage is broad, there are frequently physical restrictions in the form of quotas.
	Complicated Country of Origin procedures ensure that not all products shipped from a beneficiary country are deemed as having sufficient local content or other characteristics to merit receiving preferential treatment and hence escape MFN tariffs or other barriers.  As a result, utilization of preferential quotas may be less than 100%.  In product ranges where utilization rates are 100%, it may be safely assumed that some form of import restriction is limiting further LDC exports. On the other hand, it should also be recognized that low utilization rates may not always be due to obstacles limiting qualification for preferential treatment but may merely be an indication of the lack of export capacity of LDCs and their inability to fill a preferential quota.  Finally, as Krishna points out, Rules of Origin are a form of hidden protection, having tariff-like effects by raising the price of intermediate inputs.​[32]​  Moreover, as she points out, there is plenty of scope for any well organized industry to arrange that the rules are devised to provide insulation from the effects of a preferential trade agreement. 
	Growing energy imports by both the US and EU at a time of rising oil prices have recently inflated the value of the imports covered by the schemes, disguising the fact that oil imports from a small number of LDCs are responsible for the vast bulk of preferential trade.  The heavy concentration of the value of US and EU preferential imports on a narrow product range such as oil and minerals, to the exclusion of the so-called sensitive sectors, and the small number of LDCs responsible for these imports, may not be widely recognized.

Table 3: US and EU15 Imports from LDCs under Preferential Arrangements

	Value $ billion	Coverage rate %	Utilisation rate %
US Imports			
From LDC under GSP 2001	7.2	44	96
From SSA under AGOA 2001​[33]​	17.7	69	44
			
EU15 Imports			
From LDC members of  ACP 2001​[34]​	8.1	100	76
From LDC under GSP 2001	4.4	99	47
From all LDC under EBA 2002	12.9	100	39
From LDC members of ACP under EBA 2002	8.5	100	3
From non-ACP LDC under EBA 2002	4.4	100	57
Source: UNCTAD 2003.
	EU15 imports from ACP LDCs are heavily concentrated in a small number of product categories.  In 2001, mineral products (oil) and precious stones accounted for 31% and 23% of total EU15 imports from ACP LDCs.  EU15 imports under GSP are also concentrated.  In 2001, textiles and clothing accounted for $3.3 billion of the $4.4 billion total – a 75% share.  In addition to the product concentration, Panagariya sees a concentration of benefits with only “a handful of countries –Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Jamaica—have benefited perceptibly from preferences”​[35]​
	In the case of the US, petroleum accounts for approximately 90% of the trade value covered by the US GSP and 80% of US imports under AGOA.​[36]​  Indeed, of the $7.2 billion of US imports from LDCs in 2001, the two categories of textiles and clothing ($3.5 bl.) and mineral products ($2.9bl )--largely oil-- accounted for the vast bulk of the total.  
	Table 3 indicates that, with the EBA extension of the EU’s GSP, a notable gap was opened in the product coverage of the US and EU preference schemes for LDCs.  However, a deeper look at relative range of coverage would need to look at coverage ratios based on product categories rather than mere import values.  If it enters duty free and if there are severe limitations on other product categories, the value of EU-LDC trade covered by GSP and AGOA preferences may be reported as high even while many product categories representing potential LDC and/or SSA exports are excluded.  Similarly, if US oil imports from LDCs are excluded from the calculation, the coverage calculation for the US would drop from 44% to 4%​[37]​  Yu and Jensen report the results of a number of studies which have sought to measure the welfare gains accruing to LDCs from the EBA program, with a number of estimates approximating $400 million.​[38]​  Their own estimate of the welfare gains to LDCs of EBA is quite modest, with welfare gains for all LDCs of less than $300 million.
	Even for those LDCs which are ACP members, thus qualifying for more preferential treatment than other LDCs, Table 3 shows that almost one quarter of the preferences offered were not availed of in 2001.  Thus, approximately one quarter of the EU’s recorded imports from ACP countries which were LDCs was subject to the EU’s MFN tariff wall. Non-ACP LDCs fared even less well under the EU’s GSP which, with a similar average coverage rate to that available to ACP countries, had an average utilization rate of only 47% in 2001.  
	The EU’s EBA amendment to its GSP program expanded the product coverage of the EU preferential scheme with improved LDC GSP market access for agriculture and textiles.  However, while the EBA extended the product coverage by allowing duty-free imports of qualifying textiles, rigorous enforcement of country of origin rules resulted in only 56% of EBA country textile exports escaping the average 10% MFN tariff in 2002.  Indeed, after the introduction of EBA, most LDC ACP countries continued to export to the EU under their long established ACP preferences rather than switch to the new customs formalities attached to EBA.

Doha Round Potential Impact on Transatlantic Preferences to Developing Countries 
	Developing countries have faced erosion of preferences after every GATT or WTO trade round.  However, the stakes are considerably higher with Doha, particularly for developing country preference erosion in the US and EU markets.  The US now has a more elaborate system of preferences than when it participated in earlier rounds.  An IMF submission to the WTO points out that textiles and agriculture account for a large part of the present preferences enjoyed by developing countries and that the erosion of preferences could be substantial for about two dozen developing countries.​[39]​
	The Doha stress on agriculture and the simultaneous end of textile protection with the expiration of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) has introduced new competitive pressure in two sectors of particular importance to developing countries. Cuts in MFN tariffs in agriculture, where tariffs are particularly high, and continued liberalization in textiles and clothing where China has rapidly gained market share, will have a particular impact on developing countries.  As discussed below, while the Uruguay Round was the first to include agriculture, the outcome of the round did not involve enormous reductions in US or EU agricultural protection and hence little erosion of preferences.  The Doha Round agricultural package promises to be more substantial.
	Apart from its other negotiating objectives, the EU may be expected to wish for a Doha Round outcome which, like earlier Rounds, maintains its use of preferential trading arrangements.  This becomes more difficult as each Round’s liberalization reduces preferential margins and leads to calls for compensation from ACP countries finding the value of their preferences reduced. With its extensive network of preferential arrangements, all but nine WTO members face lower tariffs than the MFN rate.  The nine, listed in table 1 accounted for 34% of EU15 merchandise imports in 2002.​[40]​ 
	The negative impacts of preference erosion depend in part on the extent to which existing preferences were being utilized prior to tariff reduction.  The granting of preferences does not ensure that they are utilized.  In many instances, developing countries have not been able to make full use of the preferences on offer.  Capacity constraints may limit export potential, particularly for the Least Developed Countries, a category which includes many ACP countries and many beneficiaries of both the EU and US GSP schemes.  Complicated country of origin rules, and their rigorous interpretation, also serves to limit utilization.​[41]​  According to UNCTAD estimates, only 40% of the preferences available under the GSP systems of developed countries are utilized.​[42]​ 
	While US and EU tariff cuts will erode preferential margins, there is a further erosion in preferential margins likely to occur as the EU’s CAP continues to move away from price supports.  A number of developing countries have benefited not only from preferential access to the EU market, but from the high internal prices associated with the CAP.  The shift to the EU’s Single Payment and away from price supports will entail welfare losses for those developing countries previously included in the common market organizations of the CAP.  
	As the US and EU reduce their barriers to market access in agriculture and textiles, some of the current beneficiaries of preferences face potential losses of export revenue as they are displaced by more competitive developing countries.  The IMF’s new lending facility, the Trade Integration Mechanism, introduced in March 2004, is one attempt to provide a lending facility designed to cope with resultant balance of payments problems.  The new facility provides temporary balance of payments financing for problems associated with the implementation of WTO agreements.  The financing would also be available to assist with balance of payments problems caused by developing countries engaging in trade liberalization as part of their WTO commitments. 


IV. Two Key Sectors
	While there are other sectoral issues included in the July 2004 Framework Agreement, agriculture is clearly the key sector.  Lying in the background is a second sector, textiles, where all participants are grappling with the consequences of the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Trade in Textiles which required the ending of textile quotas by January 2005. The textile sector is now fully under the WTO regime and hence is a sector subject to tariff negotiations on manufactures.  While the EU and US (and many other developed and developing countries) have high protection on textiles, developing countries, including the Big Emerging Market countries included in the G 20, tend to have high protection of all their sectors—agriculture, manufacturing and services.  

Agriculture 
	Agriculture has figured prominently in transatlantic maneuverings in multilateral trade negotiations since the Kennedy Round and the launch of the CAP in 1962. Until the Uruguay Round, the EU had resisted US efforts to have agriculture included in the Kennedy or Tokyo Rounds in any meaningful way. However, the Uruguay Round coincided with the McSharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy and made it possible for the EU to finally acquiesce to US efforts to have agriculture included in the scope of the negotiations. The McSharry reforms initiated the twin processes of moving most EU agricultural prices downwards toward world levels and shifting subsidies toward income support rather than price support.  By bringing EU prices closer to world levels, the incentives which lead to production surpluses were reduced and the size of the export subsidies needed to sell those surpluses abroad was also reduced.​[43]​
	While the Cairns Group of exporters of temperate foodstuffs played an important part in the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations, the outcome was largely the result of US-EU agreement.  In the Doha Round, while the US and EU remain dominant, a larger group of countries have a stake in the outcome.  Diao et al. have estimated that developed country protectionism and subsidization costs developing countries at least $24 billion annually in lost agricultural and agro-industrial income and that removal of all protection and subsidization would triple developing country net agricultural exports.​[44]​  They attribute more than half of the displacement of agricultural trade to the EU’s trade distorting policies, with the US responsible for less than a third. Two developing country members of the Cairns group, Argentina and Brazil, particularly stand to benefit from reductions in US and EU agricultural export subsidies.  Table 4 lists the top 15 agricultural exporters and importers in 2003.  China and Russia appear on both lists.  Many of the G-20 developing countries seeking to curtail US and EU agricultural subsidies are included in the list of top exporters. 









EU members (15)	284.14	42.2	EU members (15)	308.87	42.8


















Source: WTO, “Agriculture Negotiations Backgrounder: The issues and where we are now”  Dec. 1 2004

	The Doha Round agricultural discussions pick up where the URAA left off.  While the Uruguay Round brought limited cuts in the subsidization and protection of US and EU agriculture, it had been successful in bringing tariffication to market access barriers in agricultural trade.  By replacing non-tariff barriers by a numerical equivalent, URAA tariffication allows much of the Doha Round negotiations to focus on the use of tariff-cutting formulae of the type so successful in reducing manufacturing tariffs in earlier rounds. 


The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
 	The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) dealt with the same three areas as the Doha Round—market access, domestic support and export competition. Two out of the three dimensions of the URAA package were consistent with the direction in which the CAP was already evolving.  However, improved market access has not been a notable feature of CAP reform programs. 
	The URAA market access provisions called for converting agricultural trade barriers into tariff-equivalents, with developed countries cutting the resulting tariffs by an average of 36%.  In addition, a minimum degree of market access would be available for all products.  This minimum was enforced through the use of tariff quotas under which limited quantities would enter a market at a lower tariff rate.  The export competition provisions called for a 36% cut in the value of subsidies from 1986-90 levels and a 21% cut in the volume of subsidized exports.  The agreed cuts had been fully implemented by developed countries, including the EU and US, by the end of 2000.  In addition to seeking to control export subsidies, the URAA sought to control domestic subsidies, termed Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS).  The URAA cuts are detailed in Table 5.










Average cut for all agricultural products 	-36%	-24%
minimum cut per product	-15%	-10%
Domestic support	 	 
total AMS cuts for sector (base period: 1986-88)	-20%	-13%
Exports	 	 
Value of subsidies	-36%	-24%
subsidized quantities (base period: 1986-90)	-21%	-14%




	The URAA introduced a traffic light classification of green, amber and red “boxes” into which domestic agricultural subsidization policy instruments could be placed.  An all important Blue box is also part of the system. Policies considered to be already WTO-incompatible (and hence not the subject of negotiation) are placed in the Red Box.
	Policies which are not trade distorting, or have minimal distorting effects, are considered to be acceptable.  These are placed in the Green Box and were not the subject of URAA reductions.  Examples include environmental protection programs, regional development subsidies and direct income support to farmers where the payments are “decoupled” from current production levels or prices.
	With a few exceptions, all domestic subsidies which distort production or trade fall into the Amber Box.  These subsidies, termed the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), became the subject of the URAA reduction of a 20% cut from the 1986-1988 levels of AMS.
	Domestic support which was not decoupled from production (and thus would normally join other support measures in the Amber Box) but where the subsidy is linked to production for the purpose of reducing production and hence reducing trade distortion was placed in the special Blue Box.  Blue Box subsidization, as Green Box subsidization, had no spending limits under the URAA. The current CAP reform Single Payment is designed to conform to the Green Box.

The URAA’s Limited Outcome  
	As this discussion should make clear, WTO members which wish to continue to subsidise their farmers without facing WTO constraints need to redesign their support systems so that the subsidies fall into the Green or Blue Boxes.​[45]​  CAP reform is based on this premise with, to date, restraints on spending consisting of the reported France-German agreement that CAP spending will not be reduced through the end of the next Financial Perspective in 2013.
	The URAA has been far from dramatic in its impact on US and EU farm protection and export subsidization.  At least three reasons may be advanced.

1.	The years chosen, at French insistence, to act as the base years from which export subsidies would be cut were years when the level of subsidization was far above that prevailing in the years when the cuts were actually implemented.  Thus, the actual reductions in subsidization were quite small.
2.	In the process of converting existing quotas into tariffs, many agricultural tariffs were raised to ensure that the 36% cut had very little impact on the barriers to market access.
3.	Confinement of URAA reductions to export subsidies and to the AMS, exempting Green Box and Blue Box support, provides a further ready explanation for why transatlantic agricultural support remains at such a high level years after the full implementation of the URAA.

	The continued high level of developed country, including EU and US, trade barriers against agricultural exports and their continued reliance on subsidization of the sector has undoubtedly had an impact on the exports of developing countries.  Developing country shares of world agricultural exports have remained relatively constant at 36-37% over the past twenty years while their share of world manufacturing exports have grown from 19% to 33%.​[46]​  

Transatlantic Agriculture Now
	While the URAA has brought greater transparency to the agricultural policies of both the US and EU, it has not brought much greater market access to either each other or developing countries.  It has also not brought much reduction in total subsidization of transatlantic agriculture.  The particular choice of the base years from which to make the AMS cuts, and the many exceptions from the domestic support cuts, particularly the US’ ultimate acceptance of the EU’s invention of the Blue Box, and the EU’s ultimate acceptance that US export credits would not be included, resulted in an URAA outcome in which both sides of the Atlantic not only continue to protect their agriculture to a considerable extent but also provide large subsidies to the sector.  EU border protection is a multiple of US protection and its subsidization contains a larger export element than the US.   Table 6 indicates current levels of protection and subsidization.  Of course, budgetary expenditure on subsidies represents but a fraction of total agricultural support.  The OECD’s measure of support, the Producer Support Estimate (PSE), which measures the percentage of producer value added attributable to government programs whether budgetary or otherwise, is found in table 7.







Source: Aksoy, Ataman M. and Beghin, John C. Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries (World Bank, 2004)

	Between 1995 and 2000, as the URAA cuts were being implemented, WTO members spent $36 billion on export subsidies alone, with the EU accounting for 90% of the total and the US for 2%.​[47]​ The US is the largest user of export credit programs. According to Josling and Hathaway, in the years leading up to the 2000 URAA implementation deadline, US export subsidies were largely concentrated on dairy products while EU export subsidies were concentrated on butter, beef and skimmed milk powder, although wheat and other grains had also received export subsidies.
	The EU pattern has changed in recent years. The €3.4 billion of EU export subsidies in 2002 were concentrated on two commodity categories: sugar (€1.4 billion) and milk and milk products (€1.2 billion)​[48]​ Total export subsidies accounted for 8% of the €43.2 billion CAP Guarantee spending in that year.  Appendix A.5 contains the product coverage of EU budgetary commitments for agricultural export subsidies. Table 7 indicates recent transatlantic trends in total agricultural producer support, in dollars and euro, as well as the percentage PSE. Details by individual commodities may be found in Appendices A1 and A2.  As table 7 illustrates, the overall degree of EU subsidization of agriculture, as measured by %PSE, is twice that of the US and shows little indication of falling in the years since the URAA was implemented.  The US, on the other hand, shows a marked decline.
















	Bouët, Antoine et al. have calculated the average bilateral tariff rates being applied by the US and EU25 in the agricultural sector.​[49]​  Table 7A shows their results.  In both cases, the averages are the result of the commodity composition of their agricultural trade with particular suppliers and the individual tariff rates applied to specific commodities.  Their results are not always completely comparable to other published results.  Nevertheless they show the same genera pattern of clear differences between the two sides of the Atlantic.  In particular, the table indicates the extent of EU protection against the exports of Cairns Group countries, both developing and developed country members.




















	With an EU tariff structure containing an average applied MFN tariff rate of approximately 6.5% in 2004, but with individual tariff rates ranging from 0% to 209.9% (on some milk products), agricultural products still attract the highest rates following the tariffication of agricultural protection introduced by the URAA.​[50]​  The average tariff rate on agricultural imports is 16.5% while the average tariff on non-agricultural imports is 4.1%. Moreover, agricultural tariffs are bolstered by the use of tariff quotas which have an average fill rate of approximately 67%.
	The EU’s barriers to market access for agricultural products are complex and extremely sophisticated. CAP barriers on market access include tariff quotas, i.e. restricted quantities that can be imported at lower than normal-often prohibitive-tariff rates, on 89 separate agricultural products.  Twenty of these 89 tariff quotas are based on a first-come-first-served basis.  Twenty two others are based on historic levels of imports and the remaining 47 are based on a mixture of allocation methods.​[51]​  On average, only about two thirds of the available tariff quota is utilized.
	In addition to ad valorem tariffs and tariff quotas, the EU tariff structure includes widespread use of specific duties, i.e. duties not based on the value of imports.  Many agricultural products face not only an ad-valorem duty but an additional complicated specific duty levied on several of the individual ingredients used in the production of the imported product.  Entry of fruits and vegetables is controlled by a system of minimum entry prices.  Potential imports arriving at an EU border are levied a flexible tariff to raise their price to the entry price and then are levied the fixed MFN tariff.  The effect is to continue the sheltering of EU producers from low priced imports.  EBA countries do not face these restrictions.  The EBA provides for duty-free imports and abolition of the entry price restrictions.
	The URAA and CAP reform have included some small reduction in agricultural import barriers. Tariffs on agricultural imports averaged 10% ‑ 16.5% in 2004, with tariff peaks rising up to a rate of 209.9%. ​[52]​ The total amount spent on the CAP still represents over 40% of Community expenditure. 
	While the bulk of EU15 imports from ACP countries are not agricultural products (only 22% in 2003), the agricultural imports are concentrated in a narrow range of products with cocoa and cocoa preparations accounting for 30% of EU15 agricultural imports from ACP countries, edible fruits and nuts 18%, sugars and confectionery 9%, beverages 8%.​[53]​

 US Agricultural Protection
	While the average US MFN tariff was just over 5% in 2002, the average on agricultural products was 10%.  As with the EU, the highest tariffs, whether ad valorem or ad valorem equivalent rates, are on agricultural products which are of particular interest to developing countries. Some products, including tobacco, peanuts, certain dairy products and sugar receive tariff protection in the 50-350% range.​[54]​  The 2002 tariff on tobacco was 350%, on peanuts 164%.  By comparison, the highest non-agricultural tariffs are on footwear at 58.5%. 
	As with the EU, US agricultural protection includes a considerable reliance on tariff quotas.  These are detailed in Appendix A.1.   As Appendix A.1 shows, the administration of tariff quotas frequently involves preferential access to the quota for a select group of countries.  For example, imports of blue cheese are restricted to four countries:  the European Union, which gets 96% of the quota with Chile, the Czech Republic and Argentina sharing the remainder.  Argentina is the favoured supplier of peanuts, holding 84% of that tariff quota.  Sugar, as with the EU, is also quota controlled.




	The US makes little use of direct export subsidies of the type found in the CAP. Instead, it relies on export credit programs to promote agricultural exports.  Details of the product coverage of US export subsidies are found in Appendix A.5. In 2002, export credits were $3.4 billion with South America, Mexico, Turkey, and South Korea as the top export markets.​[56]​  In 2002, US agricultural exports were US$53 billion, amounting to 24% of total US agricultural production.  Imports were US$42 billion.  Soybeans were the single largest export category at $5.5 billion.  Red meats, corn, and vegetable products, each recorded 2002 exports levels over $4 billion each.  Agricultural sectors with the greatest dependence on exports are rice, wheat, cotton and soybeans.  In 2000, the share of exports in the value of production was 42% for rice, 48% for wheat, 39% for cotton, and 37% for soybeans.​[57]​  The largest import categories were fruit products and vegetable products, each with levels over $5 bl.

The Blue Box Lives




Table 8: Transatlantic Blue Box Agricultural Support









Source: WTO Secretariat TN/AG/S/14 Jan 28, 2005


Two Important WTO Panel Reports
	Even as the Doha Round has proceeded, a range of developing countries have used the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO to target specific agricultural policies of both the US and EU.  Developing countries (and the US) had successfully attacked the EU banana regime as incompatible with EU WTO obligations.  A 1997 WTO Appellate Body report upheld an earlier panel report supporting the complaints filed by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. The successful complaint pitted the producers and distributors of one group of developing countries against another, less competitive but more privileged, group. The EU is due to finally scrap its quota-ridden banana importation policy and move to a tariff-only banana regime no later than January 2006.
	Caught between the demands of its traditional ACP suppliers and dollar zone producers fresh from their WTO Panel victory, the EU announced in January 2005 that it would replace its present three-part quota system with a new single tariff regime using a MFN tariff level of €230 per tonne, triple the current tariff level of €75 per tonne.​[60]​ The EU also intends to maintain a margin of preference for ACP producers who had sought to convince the EU to adopt an MFN tariff of €275 per tonne which would have provided an even larger margin of preference over “dollar zone” producers.  ACP producers are not the only ones interested in limiting market access from dollar zone producers.  Two member states, Spain, with production in the Canary Islands, and France, with production in some overseas territories, had strongly supported ACP demands.  Under the WTO waiver for the Cotonou Agreement, agreed in Doha at the launch of the round, this level of banana protection is subject to arbitration between the EU and the banana producing countries affected by the proposed new preferences.  Led by Ecuador, seven Latin American producers have rejected the EU’s proposed new regime and, in the event of WTO arbitration, the US, which brought the original 1995 complaint to the WTO is likely to be an interested party.  Chiquita Brands and Dole Food each are responsible for approximately one quarter of international banana trade.​[61]​    
	
US Cotton Policy	
	US cotton policy and EU sugar policy have been particular targets of developing country complaints to the WTO.  In October 2002, Brazil initiated a complaint against the US claiming, inter alia, that US cotton subsidies exceeded the level to which the US had agreed under the URAA and that United States domestic support measures were export subsidies.  The US provides over $3 billion annually in domestic support to 25,000 cotton farmers. Other developing countries joining the Brazilian complaint were a mix of middle income developing countries and some least developed African countries --- Argentina, Benin, Chad, China, India, Paraguay and Taiwan. Canada and the EC also were parties to the complaint. A WTO panel found that $3.3 billion of cotton subsidies and $1.6 billion of export credits for cotton and other products contravened US WTO obligations. The US appealed the decision but in March 2005, the WTO Appellate Body upheld Brazil’s complaint.​[62]​ ​[63]​  The unsuccessful US appeal was supported in a number of its arguments by the EU which argued that the US domestic support belonged in the URAA Green Box.​[64]​  As mentioned earlier, the Doha Round Framework Agreement has established a special cotton subcommittee to ensure that the sector is given priority in any Doha Round outcome. 

EU Sugar Policy
	The EU has not fared any better in defending its agricultural policy against developing country recourse to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.  An October 2004 panel found that EU sugar export subsidies exceeded its URAA limits.​[65]​  This dispute was initiated by Brazil, Thailand –and Australia. Other countries expressing an interest in the case were Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Fiji, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, New Zealand, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, --- and the United States.
	The submissions of the US in the dispute supported the complainants.  The submissions of the ACP countries and India (countries which benefit from the present sugar regime and face the loss of sugar regime rents) supported the EU.  Much of the dispute hinged on the interpretation to be placed on a footnote which the EU had attached to its schedule of commitments when the URAA was negotiated.  The EU, supported by the ACP countries and India, argued that the footnote had been inserted with the intent of limiting its export subsidy reduction commitments by excluding from URAA reductions a volume of subsidised sugar equivalent to its imports from ACP countries and India. The adverse finding has major implications for the direction of reform of the EU sugar regime, a sector which has escaped inclusion in CAP reform to date. Eventual sugar reform and compliance with WTO obligations will require bringing internal prices down.  ACP countries have already asked for compensation against price and income losses likely from reform.  Meanwhile, other ACP countries and EBA countries have sought sugar quotas.  The current sugar regime expires in July 2006.  The WTO Appellate Body report in this case is expected in late April 2005.  
	The EU is a major producer of sugar, with the EU15 accounting for 13% of world production, 15% of world exports and 5% of world imports.​[66]​  Approximately 20% of EU15 sugar production is exported.  Currently the sector is sheltered behind post-URAA tariffs averaging 23.6%, but with tariff peaks rising up to 114.4%. The most recent enlargement added seven more sugar producers to the EU (all of the ten new members except Estonia, Cyprus and Malta). Poland is the largest producer of the new entrants.  The Copenhagen summit established initial production quotas for all seven with the understanding that these quotas, both A quota and B quota sugar, would be cut in line with cuts by all member states to ensure the EU met its URAA obligations on both value and volumes of subsidized exports.
	As an unreformed sector which escaped CAP reform to date, the EU sugar regime is characterized by high support prices which have recently been two to three times the level of world prices, preferential market access to a handful of developing countries which receive the high CAP prices, a complex system of import and production quotas, and considerable domestic overproduction with the resultant need to dispose of the surpluses through export subsidies.  Widely recognized as unsustainable in the post-URAA world, the regime has been the subject of a variety of reform proposals yet to be implemented.
	The current EU sugar policy has its origin in UK accession to the EEC, bringing with it its Commonwealth Agreements on sugar imports to the UK.​[67]​  These agreements were incorporated in the Sugar Protocol to the Lomé Agreement in 1975 which provided import quotas to ACP countries. India, a non-ACP country but a traditional UK supplier, signed a similar agreement and received an import quota. With Finnish accession, two traditional Finnish suppliers, Brazil and Cuba, also received small import quotas.  More recently, as part of its policy toward the Balkans, the EU has accepted a low level of sugar imports from the former Yugoslavia.  All these imports enter duty-free and receive the high EU support price.
	Nineteen ACP countries are signatories to the EU-ACP Sugar Protocol.  Of the nineteen, only six are LDCs—Belize, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Trinidad &Tobago and Zambia.  In the 2003/2004 marketing year, fifteen ACP countries and India shared a total ACP/India import quota of 1.3 ml. tonnes.​[68]​ According to Oxfam, five countries—Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana, Swaziland and Jamaica take up 80% of the total quota.​[69]​  None of these five are LDCs and some are high cost producers likely to be threatened by an EU switch to support prices closer to world levels.  In addition to the restricted entry available through the Sugar Protocol, the EBA provides for further market access for a small group of LDCs, though the EBA sugar quota is extremely small and will only reach 197,355 tonnes in 2009, after which all EBA sugar imports will be duty free.  Again, according to Oxfam, only five LDCs –Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia benefit from the Sugar Protocol or Special Preferential Sugar arrangements and have only 4% of the total sugar quotas.  Some of these LDCs are low cost producers and are likely to be highly competitive in the future but to date have been discriminated against in favour of other high cost ACP producers.
	Reform proposals have carried the expectation that there would be compensation for the developing countries presently enjoying market access.  Commissioner Boel has announced that she is seeking a political agreement on a new sugar regime by December 2005, which would coincide with the Hong Kong Ministerial.​[70]​  In the meantime the Commission has drafted an Action Plan for the affected countries.  The plan calls for including preferential sugar access clauses in the EPAs presently under negotiation and providing development aid to promote diversification away from sugar and to cushion the effects of the future lower prices.  This preferential access would continue to be at the expense of the low cost sugar producers who filed the WTO complaint—producers such as Brazil, Thailand and Australia.  In addition, the design of any preferential access also places the EU in an unenviable position between high cost ACP countries seeking continued high prices and restricted entry, and some other low cost ACP countries able to compete at low prices but previously limited in their market access to the EU.
	. 
Textiles
	While agriculture is of great interest to developing countries, so too are textiles.  This manufacturing sector is finally coming under full WTO disciplines. The Doha Round has coincided with the end of US and EU quota protection of their textile producers.  The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) expired at the end of 2004, bringing to an end forty years of a formal multilaterally negotiated quota-based system of protection of developed country textile industries, particularly those of the EU and US.  From 1974-1994, US and EU clothing and textile industries were protected by the quotas of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) which had been negotiated bilaterally between importing and exporting countries outside the legal confines of the GATT. The MFA replaced the earlier 1965 Long Term Cotton Agreement which served a similar purpose.  Introduced in 1995, the WTO ATC called for a ten year transition period to phase out quota protection.
	Although textile quotas have ended, US and EU textile protection of their domestic producers has not.  Domestic markets are still protected by tariffs and by the threat of contingent protection.  Both the US and EU have made clear that they will continue to protect their domestic producers if they face a sudden surge in textile imports.  A variety of WTO-compatible temporary measures are available to them to achieve this purpose.  Of most immediate import is the Textiles-Specific Safeguard Clause (TSSC) inserted into China’s protocol of accession to the WTO in 2001.  The clause allows any WTO member experiencing market disruption from imports from China to seek consultations with China with a view to China limiting its exports of specific textile products to the level recorded during the first twelve of the fourteen months prior to a complaint plus 7.5%​[71]​.  In the event that China did not restrict its exports, the TSSC allows the complaining country to impose import quotas for a twelve-month period.  The clause contains an injury test which must be met prior to invoking the clause.  This requires the importing country to show that the imports are causing market disruption which would “impede the orderly development” of the sector. The TSSC expires at the end of 2008. At that time, textile importing countries would still have recourse to the normal temporary safeguards provisions of Article XIX.
	The ending of the old quota system has had an additional complication for both the US and EU in their relations with third countries.  The arrival of China as the dominant WTO textile producer poses a competitive threat not only to US and EU textile producers but to the developing country beneficiaries of the previous system of quotas.  The ATC quota system provided a number of individual developing country textile producers with a guaranteed, albeit extremely limited, share of the transatlantic textile and clothing market.  The ending of the quota system opens these previously sheltered developing country producers to new competitive pressures, particularly from China.  Quota rents previously accruing to quota-owning developing country producers or their distributors are threatened.  So too are non-China production, export and employment levels.  In the absence of contingent protection measures aimed at China, other traditional suppliers to both the US and EU face a loss of market share.
	In April 2005, the Commission announced what it described as “guidelines” it would use to determine whether the TSSC should be invoked.  This early warning system established a sliding scale of limits on the growth in imports from China based on China’s share of the EU market in 2004.  For products where China’s market share was already in excess of 35%, imports in excess of  10% of the 2004 would trigger Commission action in any of the years from 2005-2008. For products where China’s 2004 market share was 7.5% or less, imports in excess of 100% of the 2004 would trigger similar Commission action.  In drawing up its guidelines, the commission had made clear that the TSSC would be invoked if a textile surge from China threatened not only EU producers but the market shares of either Euro-Med suppliers or other countries which had previously had a quota share of the EU market.​[72]​
	As a relatively footloose industry, trade and investment patterns in clothing and textiles have long been very responsive to changes in quota allocation or country of origin rules.  Even with the shifts in the locus of production the destination of the quota rents may not have changed.  If a large number of developing country producers face a limited number of large importing firms, it may be safely assumed that the quota rents do not all accrue to the exporting firms.​[73]​
	While the EU and US textile producers share a common interest in having governments maintain protection, the EU also possesses a very competitive high-value component to its textile industry.  This is largely located in Italy and while the EU runs an overall trade deficit in textiles, several member states--Italy, Portugal and Belgium-- run trade surpluses in textiles.  Thus, obtaining greater market access for EU textile exports is among the negotiating objectives of the EU in the Doha Round.  Textiles are also of particular concern to the new members.  Moreover, textiles and clothing are a major component in Euro Med country preferential exports to the EU.
  	The textile and clothing sector is of roughly rather similar economic importance on both sides of the Atlantic, with a slightly greater importance in the EU25 than in the US.  EU enlargement increased the share of the sector in EU25 employment since the new members have a greater reliance on the sector as a job source than EU15. US textile and apparel industries employed 816 thousand workers, or 6% of manufacturing employment in 2003, producing 3% of manufacturing value added.​[74]​ On the eastern side of the Atlantic, the textiles and clothing sector accounts for approximately 5% of manufacturing output in the CEEC10 and 4% in the EU15.​[75]​  Employing 3.3 million workers in 2001, the sector accounts for 9.5% of EU25 manufacturing employment and 5% of manufacturing value added.​[76]​  Just as the sector is heavily concentrated in a small number of states in the US, a similar pattern is obvious in the EU. Several of the peripheral and new member states are particularly dependent on textile employment.  In 2001, the sector accounted for over 30% of manufacturing employment in Portugal and 25% in Lithuania.  It provided 17% of manufacturing jobs in Italy. 
	Together, the EU and US account for over 40% of world imports of clothing and textiles, with the US holding a 22% share of world imports in 2003 and the EU holding a 20% share. Two-way trade in textiles and clothing is a major component of EU trade, accounting for just under 6% of EU15 trade in 2002.​[77]​ The EU15 was already the world’s largest importer of textiles and clothing and the largest exporter of clothing. The EU25 has a growing trade deficit in textiles, with China, Turkey, India, Tunisia and Romania accounting for 46% of EU15 imports in 2002​[78]​.  China’s share of the EU15 market had already reached 20% in that year.

Sources of US and EU Textile Imports	
	Table 9 shows the major suppliers of textiles and clothing to both the US and EU15 in 2003.  Six countries accounted for over half of US imports.  The sources of EU15 imports are less concentrated.  Even in the highly mobile world of textile plants, AGOA countries are still insignificant suppliers to the US although the exports of some AGOA countries such as Lesotho are a significant part of that country’s total exports, GDP and employment.​[79]​   China was the dominant supplier in both markets in 2003 and the latest data indicate a dramatic increase in its market share in early 2005 with the lifting of quotas.  The US is an important market for the EU.
	These shares are in the process of changing drastically.  China’s share in both imports and apparent consumption is rising rapidly as it displaces both domestic producers and traditional producers previously protected by possession of the property right of a quota. Of course, the end of the ATC’s textile quotas does not mean free trade in textiles, because textile imports still face an MFN tariff and still face the risk of contingent protection measures if there are sudden surges. However, the MFN tariff provides limited shelter to traditional suppliers who benefit from AGOA, ACP or GSP preferences in either the US or EU markets.
	The formal end of US and EU quota protection for this sector has seen both sides of the Atlantic respond in a similar manner, particularly in their warnings to China that textile exports should be restrained in the absence of formal trade US and EU barriers.  Concern regarding Chinese export surges are not limited to fears of possible damage to the textile and clothing sectors of the US and EU textile and clothing industries but reflect a broader concern that unrestrained Chinese exports would damage the export industries of such low income countries as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Morocco and Tunisia which have previously benefited from the quota rents attached to the quotas they possessed under the previous arrangements.  With its strong use of trade preferences as an instrument of foreign policy, this is particularly an issue for the EU.  The ability to offer discriminatory sheltered access to the EU market to favoured developing countries, particularly ACP countries, is threatened.  It is also an issue for the US whose AGOA, Caribbean and Andean regional preferential arrangements provide for duty free and quota free imports which, though less than 10% of total US imports in this sector, are of great importance to the affected countries.
	A member of the WTO only since 2001, China’s policy response has taken the form of imposing export taxes on textiles to discourage “excessive’ exports.  Both the EU and US have placed textile imports from China under surveillance with the expectation that any sudden surge in imports will be met by the imposition of safeguard measures in the form of temporary import restrictions.  The decline in the value of the Yuan against the euro since 2002, associated with the Yuan’s peg to the declining dollar, has added an additional source of pressure felt by EU, but not US producers.  This exchange rate effect has also impacted on some developing country producers serving both the EU and US markets.







































Source:  WTO International Trade Statistics 2004 Tables IV.60 and IV.68
Conclusion
	Both the US and EU have used trade policy as an instrument in their relations with developing countries.  When WTO negotiations, such as the Doha Round occur, the two sides of the Atlantic must deal not only with their respective demands vis a vis each other but with the demands of other round participants, including developing countries, upon whom the Doha Round has been focused.
	While there are a wide range of issues on the Doha Round agenda, this paper has restricted itself to examining a number of sectoral issues under discussion in the round, particularly agricultural and textiles, and has discussed the manner in which US and EU preferences toward developing countries are evolving.  This evolution is also being driven by recent defeats suffered by the US and EU at the hands of developing countries in WTO panel decisions.  The growing body of WTO case law establishes new parameters around negotiating positions by defining new legal limits on discretionary policy.  In the case of the Doha Round, a number of recent WTO Panel decisions have provided a “helping hand” to the negotiating positions of some agricultural exporting developing countries in their negotiations with both the US and EU.
	As the EU and US seek greater market access, particularly to the markets of middle income developing countries, each will eventually need to deal with the manner in which the preferences built into their respective systems of developing country preferences are being eroded, imposing losses on previous beneficiaries.  The gainers from these preference erosions are likely to be other developing countries.  In the case of textiles, the ending of the ATC exposes previous quota-holding countries, holding either US or EU quotas, to further competition from China.  The reform of the EU’s sugar regime and its banana regime poses similar threats for existing quota holders.  The new gainers will be a different group of developing countries some of whom are not ACP members.
	The Doha Round has been a watershed in the development of effective coalitions of developing countries.  Past multilateral trade negotiations have been dominated by a US and EU agenda.  This time, the negotiating agenda envisaged at the launch of the round in Doha in 2001 has been narrowed, particularly in the wake of the Cancun Ministerial, which has seen the EU’s request for negotiations on four Singapore Issues reduced to a mere one. Regional groupings of developing countries have played a particular role to date.  This may be expected to continue as the EU seeks to negotiate EPAs with developing countries in the coming years.
	Any Doha Round agricultural agreement that follows the outlines of the July 2004 Framework for Establishing Modalities and produces an eventual end to EU agricultural export subsidies and US export credits will have major effects on developing country exporters and importers of the commodities presently subsidized.  Cairns Group and G 20 developing country exporters, such as Argentina, Chile and Brazil will benefit in third country markets currently served by EU and US agricultural exports.  South Africa is the lone ACP member of the Cairns Group.  Any ending of these agricultural export subsidies is likely to leave net food importing developing countries with higher import prices which will have distributional effects on domestic producers and consumers.  Higher domestic prices will provide an incentive to developing country producers currently facing competition from imported subsidized EU and US foodstuffs.  Meanwhile, any negotiated reduction in EU and US agricultural trade barriers is likely to provide an additional benefit to Cairns Group exporters, of whom only South Africa is an ACP country.
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Appendix A.1 US Agricultural Tariff Quotas
Products covered by tariff quotas, 2002
Products	Average tariff ratea  2002  (%)	Bound
import quota	Fill rateb 2000
(%)	Fill rateb 2002
(%)	Partners with reserved access 
(% of WTO quota)c
	In-quota	Out-of-quota				
Beef:  fresh, chilled or frozen (mt)	4.5	26.4	696,621	83	83	Canada and Mexico (no limit) AUS (57.6) NZ (32.5), Japan (0.03), Others (9.9)
Cream ('000 litres) 	2.7	26.8	6,695	51	65	NZ (87.3)
Evaporated/condensed milk  (mt)	4.1	26.6	6,857	86	87	EU (21.8), Canada (17.0) Australia (1.5)
Nonfat dried milk (mt) 	2.2	52.6	5,261	60	98	Global, no country allocation
Dried whole milk (mt) 	4.1	53.8	3,321	60	96	Global, no country allocation
Dried cream (kg.) 	16.5	43.1	99,500	10	7	Global, no country allocation
Dried whey/buttermilk (mt) 	7.2	6.8	296	27	22	Global, no country allocation
Butter (mt) 	3.7	59.5	6,977	100	98	Global, no country allocation
Butter oil/substitutes (mt) 	8.0	98.0	6,080	100	100	Global, no country allocation
Dairy mixtures (mt) 	12.9	37.0	4,105	86	100	Australia (27.7), EU (4.2)
Blue cheese (mt) 	14.4	39.0	2,911	99	97	EU (96.1), Chile (2.3), Czech Rep. (1.5), Argentina (0.07)
Cheddar cheese  (mt) 	12.0	30.5	13,256	95	98	NZ (56.8), Australia (25.4), EU (8.5), Canada (6.4) Others (2.8)
American type cheese (mt) 	14.3	58.4	3,523	89	99	NZ (57.0) Australia (28.5), EU (9.6), Others (4.8)
Edam and Gouda cheese (mt) 	12.1	50.3	6,816	98	98	EU (81.2), Costa Rica (10.2), Argentina (2.9), Uruguay (2.8), Others (3.0)
Italian type cheese (mt) 	13.9	48.1	13,481	93	99	Argentina (51.2), EU (33.5), Uruguay (7.1), Romania (3.5), Hungary (2.8), Poland (1.8), Others (0.1)
Swiss/Emmenthal cheese (mt) 	6.4	42.4	34,475	90	83	EU (62.6), Norway (20.3), Switzerland (10.6), Australia (1.5), Czech Rep.(1.0), Hungary (1.0) Others (3.0)
Gruyere process cheese (mt) 	9.3	46.7	7,855	75	86	EU (74.1), Switzerland (16.0) Others (1.0)
Other cheese NSPF (mt)	10.0	35.7	48,628	90	99	EU (56.7), NZ (25.2), Switzerland (3.6), Australia (3.3), Poland (2.7), Canada (2.5) Israel (1.5), Others (4.3)
Lowfat cheese (mt)	10.0	32.9	5,475	48	65	EU (74.2), NZ (17.5), Australia (4.4), Poland (3.1), Israel (0.9)
Peanuts (mt) 	8.5	139.8	52,906	91	100	Argentina (84.0), Others (16.0)
Chocolate crumb (mt)	4.5	15.1	26,168	81	79	EU (32.1), Australia (8.3)
Low-fat chocolate crumb (mt)	5.9	43.2	2,123	0	0	Ireland (80.1), U.K. (19.9)
Infant formula containing oligo saccharides (mt) 	17.5	64.8	100	100	100	Global, no country allocation
Green ripe olives (mt) 	1.3	1.8	730	0	0	Global, no country allocation
Place packed stuffed olives (mt) 	1.1	2.0	2,700	36	31	Global, no country allocation
Green olives, other (mt) 	2.3	2.7	550	73	69	Global, no country allocation
Green whole olives (mt) 	2.2	4.3	4,400	28	19	Global, no country allocation
Mandarin oranges (Satsuma) (mt) 	0.0	0.4	40,000	100	100	Global, no country allocation
Peanut butter and paste (mt) 	0.0	131.8	20,000	85	78	Canada (73.1), Argentina (15.4), Others (9.3)
Ice cream ('000 litres) 	20.0	30.4	5,668	59	57	EU (20.0), NZ (11.4), Jamaica (0.7)

Animal feed containing milk (mt) 	7.5	12.3	7,400	0	1	EU (75.1), NZ (24.1), AUS (0.8)
Raw cane sugar ('000 mt) 	3.4	48.8	1,117	88	81	Mexico (2.1), Others (95.3)
Other cane or beet sugars or syrups ('000 mt)	9.3	49.8	22	159	151	Canada (29.4), Mexico (8.6), Others (62.1)
Other mixtures over 10% sugar (mt)	9.2	19.6	64,709	99	99	Canada (91.6), Others (8.4)
Sweetened cocoa powder (mt) 	6.7	18.8	2,313	60	15	Global, no country allocation
Mixes and doughs (mt) 	10.0	25.8	5,398	100	100	Global, no country allocation
Mixed condiments and seasonings (mt)	7.5	13.1	689	100	45	Global, no country allocation
Tobacco (mt) 	14.3	350.0	150,700	53	75	Brazil (53.3), Malawi (8.0), Zimbabwe (8.0), Argentina (7.1),
EU (6.6), Guatemala (6.6), Others (10.5)
Short staple cotton (mt) 	0.0	13.4	20,207	2	2	Global, no country allocation
Harsh or rough cotton (mt) 	2.7	20.0	1,400	0	0	Global, no country allocation
Medium staple cotton (mt) 	1.3	6.8	11,500	2	7	Global, no country allocation
Long staple cotton (mt) 	0.8	3.0	40,100	24	13	Global, no country allocation
Cotton waste (mt)	0.0	54.4	3,335	0	0	EU (26.3), Japan (5.7), Canada (4.0), India & Pakistan combined (1.2), China (0.3)
Cotton processed but not spun (kg.)	5.0	29.0	2,500	52	100	Global, no country allocation

a	Average based on ad valorem rates or on ad valorem equivalents provided by the authorities.
b	Calculated as the ratio of actual import volumes to the bound import quota.
c	Data on country allocation based on Schedule XX.
mt	metric tonnes.
Source:	WTO WT/TPR/S/126 Table IV.2 













































TOTAL	                              18
PSE $ billion	                           38.9

Source: OECD







Non-agriculture (excl petroleum)	4.2 	0.0	0.0	0.2	2.1	1.8	1.6
By ISIC sector							






01	Live animals & prod.	11.4 	8.4	8.0	2.7	7.3	8.4	8.4
02	Vegetable products	4.0 	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.4	0.6	0.6
03	Fats & oils	3.9 	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.3	0.2	0.2
04	Prepared food etc.	13.2 	4.7	4.7	4.5	9.3	8.6	8.5
05	Minerals	0.7 	0.0	0.0 	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1
06	Chemical & prod.	3.9 	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.7	0.0	0.0
07	Plastics & rubber	3.7 	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0
08	Hides & skins	4.3 	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.5	1.3	0.7
09	Wood & articles	2.2 	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.2	0.0
10	Pulp, paper etc.	0.5 	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
11	Textile & articles	9.6 	0.1	0.1	0.4	6.2	8.1	8.1
12	Footwear, headgear	13.5 	0.0	0.0	1.8	9.2	12.0	3.7
13	Articles of stone	5.1 	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.3	0.3	0.3
14	Precious stones, etc.	3.0 	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
15	Base metals & prod.	2.3 	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.8	0.0	0.0
16	Machinery	1.6 	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
17	Transport equipment	2.6 	0.0	0.0 	0.1	1.0	0.0	0.0
18	Precision equipment	3.1 	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.3	0.0	0.0
19	Arms and ammunition	1.5 	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0
20	Miscellaneous manuf.	3.2 	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.2	0.0	0.0














Source: WTO Secretariat WT/TPR/S/126  p.43 Table III.2
CBERA: Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of the CBI; CBTPA: the United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, an expansion of the CBI;  ATPA: the Andean Trade Preference Act; ATPDEA: Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act; AGOA: African Growth and Opportunity Act.


Appendix A.5: Transatlantic Agricultural Export Subsidies: Budgetary Commitments













LIVE DAIRY CATTLE 	11.9	
EGGS 	1.6	43.7
WINE		39.2
FRUIT AND VEG. FRESH		52.8
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